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Abstract 
This paper concentrated on how US-China Trade conflicts would have impacts on Korean economy. Making the 
best use of WIOTs (World Input Output tables), this research focused on value added contents in trade instead of 
traditional trade statistics in the light of double-counting problem. Thus, the paper set two feasible bad-case 
scenarios: when China and US’s GDP fall and when China and US’s exports fall. 
Making a comparison of the results from the two models, the ripple effects that Korea would suffer from are 
bigger in China’s case. Even though it is under the same condition where China and US’s GDP identically fall by 
1%, China’s case would bring about stronger impacts on Korea. In a nutshell, the outcome illustrates that the 
extent of the damage that Korea would undergo is always larger in China’s bad-case scenarios compared to US’s 
bad-case scenarios which reveals that Korea is more associated with China than US in global value chains. The 
findings of the analysis are arranged and diagrammed in a table as follows. 
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I. Introduction 
The biggest hot issue around the world lately is trade conflicts between China and US. Since US imposed the first 
China-specific tariffs on Chinese imports in 2017, China confronted the preemptive strike with a chain of 
retaliatory tariff actions and the all-out trade war between China and US has unfolded. At present, three rounds 
of bilateral tariff plans are in effect and considering roll-out of the upcoming tariff plan delayed at the moment, 
they target a substantial amount of mutual imported goods. It seems that these trade disputes would continue to 
stagnate as they have extended the scope of the disputes from tariff to non-tariff areas. As China and US are the 
world largest economies, biggest markets and industries, it is attracting the world’s keen attention. Not confined 
to their own matters, it has brought the world to anxiety and distress. It is obvious that it would affect adverse 
impacts on countries in a range of global value chains. South Korea, one of those countries highly engaged with 
China and US respectively, is likely to be damaged by China and US’s protectionism. Thus, this study hereafter 
will observe China-US trade war and the feasible effects on Korean economy and more importantly, see trade in 
value added approach instead of the standard trade in gross term. 
In order to quantify how China and US’s protectionism would have a negative impacts on Korean economy, this 
paper assumes China and US’s bad-case scenarios on the preferential basis where China and US’s low growth 
rate and poor exports. Based on those assumptions, it would like to detect how much of effect Korea would have 
on GDP and exports. For data, it aims to fully tap into WIOTs 2014 provided by the Joint Research Centre of 
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European Commission. Basically, the paper utilizes TiVA analysis in the first model and a methodology of 
decomposition of gross exports in the second model. The findings show that there are significant impacts on 
Korean economy. Under the two models where China and US’s GDP and exports are expected to decrease, the 
extent of damage to Korea is always larger in China’s scenarios compared to US’s scenarios. 
II. Data 
This paper fundamentally underlies a good use of WIOD. Pursuant to the theme of this study, it mainly focuses 
on three countries (China, US and Korea) and counts other countries as rest of the world for computational 
convenience. Leaving the existing classification of the sectors intact, the paper utilizes the restructure of three 
countries where input output tables are recompiled from 44-country 56-sector to 4-country (China, US, Korea, 
Rest of the World) 56-sector or 3-country (China, US, Rest of the World) 56-sector in some cases. 
III. Models 
This paper aims to set two different models in which China and US would face bad-case scenarios from their 
protectionism-friendly policies. The first model assumes China and US’s slow economic growth in terms of GDP 
and it would like to observe its feasible impacts on Korea’s GDP. For measurement of their expected decrease in 
GDP, it follows the precedent studies mentioned earlier in Table 6. In this model, the study intends to see GDP by 
means of TiVA analysis. 
The second model assumes China and US’s exports reduction. In the first place, it performs elasticity analysis in 
order to compute their expected decreased exports and identifies Korea’s forward and backward linkages in China 
and US bilateral exports through decomposition of gross exports. Forward linkage represents Korea’s association 
on production side and backward linkage stands for Korea’s association on final demand side. Thus, the study 
focuses on Korea’s exports to both countries in forward linkage aspect and Korea’s GDP in backward linkage 
aspect. Thus, the paper expects that Korea would have adverse impacts on GDP and exports in these two models. 
Table 1. Research Models 
Model (1) 
(1)-1 When China’s GDP falls How much of effect would it have on Korea’s GDP? 
(1)-2 When US’s GDP falls How much of effect would it have on Korea’s GDP? 
Model (2) 
(2)-1When China’s exports to US fall 
How much of effect would it have on Korea’s exports? –
forward linkage perspective 
How much of effect would it have on Korea’s GDP? –
backward linkage perspective 
(2)-2 When US’s exports to China fall 
How much of effect would it have on Korea’s exports? –
forward linkage perspective 
How much of effect would it have on Korea’s GDP? –
backward linkage perspective 
Source: the author. 
IV. Results 
1. Reinterpretation of Trade in Value Added Approach 
Table 2. Comparison of Trade in Gross Value and Trade in Value Added (2014, billions of dollars) 
 Trade in gross value Trade in value added 
Trade balance Exports Imports Net Value Value added exports Value added 
imports 
China 582.7 2,425.5 1,842.8 598.8 1,932.8 1,334.0 
US -480.6 1,927.1 2,407.7 -416.7 1,604.2 2,020.9 
Korea 135.2 697.9 562.7 111.9 416.7 304.8 
Source: calculated by the author based on WIOT 2014 database. 
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In 2014, when it comes to comparison of trade in gross value and trade in value added, China’s  export is 
US$2,425.5billion and its import is US$ 1,842.8 billion so its trade balance amounts to US$ 582.7billion. On the 
other hand, calculating trade in TiVA method shows that China’s export is US$ 1,932.8 billion and its import is 
1,334billion and thus, net value accounts for US$ 598.8bilion and this figure is rather bigger in comparison with 
gross term. In terms of US’s trade with the world, its trade deficit reaches to US$ 480.6billion but it is US$ 416.7 
billion in TiVA term. Likewise, Korea’s trade balance is US$ 135.2billion in gross value but it is US$ 111.9billion 
in value added term. That is, the standard trade statistics has overvalued figures in gross value term due to double 
counting of intermediate output so the figures are smaller than in TiVA. 
Table 3. China’s Trade with US in Value Added (2014, billions of dollars) 
 Net value Value added exports Value added imports 
US 195.5 317.3 121.8 
Source: calculated by the author based on WIOD 2014. 
Table 4. Korea’s Trade with China and US in Value Added (2014, billions of dollars) 
 Net value Value added exports Value added imports 
China 29.5 85.0 55.5 
US 28.0 61.0 33.0 
Source: calculated by the author based on WIOD 2014. 
In view of TiVA approach, when it comes to China’s trade with US, value added exports amount to US$ 
317.3billion and value added imports amount to US$ 121.8billion. Thus, net value (trade balance in value added) 
is US$ 195.5billion and US’s trade with China, vice versa. Looking at Korea’s trade with G2 in value added, with 
respect to Korea’s trade with China, its value added exports is US$ 85billion and its value added imports is US$ 
55.5billion, whereupon the net value becomes US$ 29.5billion. In terms of Korea’s trade with US, meanwhile, 
its value added exports is US$ 61billion and its value added imports is US$ 33billion. Thus, the net value is US$ 
28billion. From net value’s point, there is no huge difference in contrast with gross value trade. 
2. When China and US’s GDP Fall 





Foreign demand (value added exports) (2) 
Total China US Korea RoW 
China 10,284.0 8,351.2 81.2% 1,932.8 - - 317.3 3.1% 55.5 0.5% 1,559.9 15.2% 
US 17,348.1 15,743.8 90.8% 1,604.2 121.8 0.7% - - 33.0 0.2% 1,449.5 8.4% 
Korea 1,287.1 870.3 67.6% 416.7 85.0 6.6% 61.0 4.7% - - 270.7 21.0% 
RoW 44,887.8 41,901.7 93.3% 2,986.1 1,127.2 2.5% 1,642.6 3.7% 216.3 0.5% - - 
Source: calculated by the author utilizing WIOD 2014. 
Note 1) Foreign demand, also known as value added exports is a given country’s value added created in foreign demand. 
Note 2) RoW stands for rest of the world. 
The table describes GDP using value added approach. Redefining the concept of it in value added aspect, GDP is 
value added created by countries (home country plus foreign countries)’ final demand. Out of GDP, China’s 
domestic demand accounts for 81.2% and the rest, 19.8% of value added is created from foreign countries’ final 
demand. In other words, foreign demand can be represented as GDP’s foreign dependence. US$ 317.3billion of 
US’s final demand contributes to value added creation in China, which is equal to 3.1% of China’s  GDP.  US$ 
55.5billion of Korea’s final demand contributes to value added creation in China, which is equal to 0.5% of all. 
In the case of US, its GDP’s domestic reliance is the highest among three countries which accounts for 90.8%. 
US’s GDP dependence on China is 0.7% of all and the one on Korea is 0.2% of all. Korea can be characterized 
as a country that has relatively low domestic dependence and high foreign dependence. Its value added created 
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from domestic demand is 67.6%, whereas its value added created from foreign demand is 33.4%. Among them, 
6.6% of Korea’s GDP comes from China’s final demand 4.7% of Korea’s GDP comes from US’s final demand. 
Table 6. How China and US’s GDP would affect Korea’s GDP (2014) 
 Korea’s GDP growth Value 
When China’s GDP fall by 1% -0.066% -US$ 850.2million 
When US’s GDP fall by 0.3% -0.014% -US$ 182.9million 
Total effect -0.080 % -US$ 1,033.1million 
Source: calculated by the author based on WIOD 2014 database. 
Note 1) Escalated protectionism would push prices up, which might induce consumers to contract spending and a country’s final demand 
would fall accordingly. On the ground of that, the paper set an assumption that China’s GDP falls by 1%, and US’s GDP falls by 0.3% 
respectively. These figures are from Table 6’s precedent studies. 
G2’s full-blown trade frictions would affect consumer’s spending and their weakened purchasing power would 
potentially exert a harmful impact on those countries’ GDP. In a scenario that China’s final demand decreases by 
1%, the consequential outcome Korea would face is US$ 850.2million of GDP reduction, which would lead to 
0.066% declined GDP growth in comparison with no GDP decline scenario baseline. Given the case that US’s 
final demand fall by 0.3%, the expected impact on Korea’s GDP is equivalent to US$ 182.9million of reduction, 
i.e., GDP down by 0.014% relative to no scenario case. Hence, in the case of total impact that China’s final 
demand decreases by 1% and US’s final demand decreases by 0.3% simultaneously, it would definitely have an 
adverse effect on Korea’s GDP amounting to approximately US$ 1billion reduction. Thus, Korea’s GDP would 
decline by 0.08% in consequence. Its detailed impacts on Korea’s by-industry GDP  is indicated as follows. 
Table 7. The Effects of China and US’s GDP decline on Korea’s By-industry GDP (2014, %, millions of 
dollars) 
 When China’s GDP fall 
by 1% 




Korea’s GDP decrease by Rate Value Rate Value Rate Value 
Sector Total 0.06605 850.177 0.01421 182.933 0.08026 1033.110 
1   Crop and animal production  0.00048 6.237 0.00009 1.202 0.00057 7.439 
2 Forestry and logging 0.00005 0.612 0.00001 0.131 0.00006 0.743 
3   Fishing and aquaculture 0.00005 0.598 0.00001 0.171 0.00006 0.769 
4 Mining and quarrying 0.00023 2.992 0.00005 0.649 0.00028 3.641 
5 Food and beverages 0.00039 5.077 0.00007 0.903 0.00046 5.980 
6 Textiles and apparel 0.00160 20.563 0.00041 5.284 0.00201 25.847 
7 Wood 0.00009 1.192 0.00002 0.232 0.00011 1.424 
8 Paper 0.00038 4.922 0.00012 1.553 0.0005 6.475 
9   Printing and recorded media  0.00013 1.729 0.00003 0.323 0.00016 2.052 
10   Coke and refined petroleum  0.00084 10.810 0.00018 2.305 0.00102 13.115 
11 Chemicals 0.00643 82.822 0.00103 13.212 0.00746 96.034 
12   Pharmaceutical products 0.00017 2.252 0.00003 0.344 0.0002 2.596 
13 Rubber and Plastic 0.00071 9.133 0.00018 2.288 0.00089 11.421 
14 Non-metallic mineral 0.00046 5.966 0.00007 0.852 0.00053 6.818 
15 Basic metals 0.00251 32.336 0.00064 8.289 0.00315 40.625 
16   Fabricated metal products 0.00200 25.784 0.00057 7.293 0.00257 33.077 
17    Computer and electronic 0.01750 225.227 0.00221 28.429 0.01971 253.656 
18 Electrical equipment 0.00276 35.586 0.00047 6.017 0.00323 41.603 
19 Machinery and equipment  0.00347 44.684 0.00061 7.908 0.00408 52.592 
20 Motor vehicles and trailers  0.00167 21.434 0.00172 22.087 0.00339 43.521 
21 Other transport equipment 0.00112 14.361 0.00021 2.686 0.00133 17.047 
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Table 7 (cont.). The Effects of China and US’s GDP decline on Korea’s By-industry GDP (2014, %, 
millions of dollars) 
 When China’s GDP fall 
by 1% 




Korea’s GDP decrease by Rate Value Rate Value Rate Value 
Sector Total 0.06605 850.177 0.01421 182.933 0.08026 1033.110 
22 Furniture 0.00070 8.999 0.00009 1.223 0.00079 10.222 
23 Repair and installation of 
machinery and equipment 
- - - - - - 
24 Electricity, gas, steam 0.00128 16.465 0.00027 3.463 0.00155 19.928 
25  Water collection, treatment and 
supply  
0.00013 1.690 0.00003 0.403 0.00016 2.093 
26 Sewerage; waste collection 0.00031 3.954 0.00007 0.948 0.00038 4.902 
27 Construction 0.00011 1.459 0.00002 0.303 0.00013 1.762 
28-56 Services 0.02046 263.303 0.00501 64.434 0.02547 327.737 
Source: calculated by the author based on WIOD 2014. 
Note: 1) Service is least considered in this paper. 
The table above elaborates how China and US’s GDP decline would have spillover effect on Korea’s GDP by 
sector. In the scenario of China’s GDP down by 1%, in detail, the most affected sector is manufacture of computer, 
electronic products (-US$ 225.2million), followed by chemicals and related products (- US$ 82.8million) and 
machinery and equipment (-US$ 44.7million) in sequence. Regarding the scenario of US’s GDP down by 0.3%, 
computer and electronic products (-US$ 28.4million) has the biggest spillover effect as well. Next come motor 
vehicles and trailers (-US$ 22.1million) and chemicals (-US$ 13.2million). Putting all together under the scenario 
of China and US’s bilateral GDP reduction from a chain of tariff strikes, the most damaged industry is 
overwhelmingly computer and electronic manufacture (-US$ 253.6million). The second most damaged is 
chemicals (-US$ 96million), followed by machinery and equipment (- US$ 52.6million), motor vehicles and 
trailers (-US$ 43.5million), and electrical equipment (-US$ 41.6million) in order. 
To sum up, considering the extent that Korea would be damaged from China and US’s economic slowdown, the 
damage from China is larger than the one from US. Even though the study applies the identical GDP reduction 
by 1%, the damage Korea would suffer from China is still larger. 
3. When China and US’s Exports Fall 
Prior to entering into the main analysis, this paper examines elasticity analysis in order to identify China and US’s 
estimated reduced imports due to mutual tariff escalation and then calculates how their exports reduction would 
have effects on Korea economy. It takes advantage of information regarding tariff growth rate and the imports 
demand elasticity. The initial stage of the calculation is computing a country’s imports reduction with the given 
information and then transposing it in the other country’s exports. So, the calculation of it is presented as follows. 
(Suppose that a commodity’s price tends to absorb 100% of tariff. For example, if 10% of tariff is applied on a 
commodity, the commodity’s price consequently increases by 10%.) 
Table 8. China and US’s Expected Exports after Tariffs Execution 
 Expected exports reduction 
China - 25.6% 
US - 21.3% 
Therefore, China-US trade war would affect China’s estimated import decline by 21.3% and in other words, US’s 
estimated exports to China would decline by 21.3%. Likewise, US’s estimated import, i.e., China’s estimated 
exports to US would be expected down by 25.6%. 
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Table 9. Calculation of G2’s Expected Imports Reduction 
 
Change of import price  






China 32.0% -0.966 68.8% -21.3% 
US 26.6% -0.997 96.8% -25.6% 
Source: calculated by the author based on import demand elasticity from Ghodsi, Grubler, and Strehrer (2016) 
Note 1) Import-weighted average tariff rates refer to Figure 5 and 7. 
Note 2) China’s tariff-affected imported goods (%) = China’s US tariff-affected imports value / China’s total imports value 
from US. 
Note 3) Import demand elasticity is identically applied to all countries. 
4. When China’s Exports to US Fall 
Table 10. Decomposition of China’s Gross Exports to US by Factors of Value Added (2014, billions of dollars) 
China’s exports to US DVA RDA FVA PDC accounting error 
347.311 277.702 1.660 55.49 5.494 6.961 
100.00% 79.96% 0.48% 15.98% 1.58% 2.00% 
Source: calculated by the author based on WIOD 2014. 
Note 1) Technically speaking, RDA can be combined as a category, DVA. 
Table 11. Decomposition of China’s Gross Exports to US by Final Destination (2014, billions of dollars) 
China’s exports to US China US Korea RoW PDC 
accounting 
error 
347.311 1.660 317.178 0.354 15.569 5.494 7.054 
100.00% 0.48% 91.32% 0.10% 4.48% 1.58% 2.03% 
Source: calculated by the author based on WIOD 2014. 
When China exports goods to US, domestic value added absorbed abroad (DVA) is US$ 277.7billion comprising about 
80% of all gross exports. Domestic value added going back to China (RDA) is US$ US$ 1.6billion accounting for 
0.48% and foreign value added from either US or Korea or rest of the world (FVA) takes up about 16% of all. When 
it comes to exports of intermediate goods, it is generated by a final demand country via additional processing and re-
exporting. Thus, the gross exports can be divided by final demand country. In terms of decomposition of China’s 
exports to US by final destination, understandably, the largest proportion is ultimately consumed in US accounting for 
91%. The percentage of its exports to US re-imported and consumed in China amounts to 0.48%. The case of spending 
final goods in Korea is 0.10% of all and US$ 354milion in dollar. 
Table 12. Decomposition of China’s Gross Exports to US by Final Destination and Value Added Factors  

































347.311 261.686 3.953 4.762 46.718 1.660 0.354 15.569 5.494 7.114 
100.00% 75.35% 1.14% 1.37% 13.45% 0.48% 0.10% 4.48% 1.58
% 
2.05% 
Source: calculated by the author based on WIOD 2014. 
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Taking account of China’s exports to US in two perspectives, final destination and value added factors at the same 
time, it can be depicted in the table above. It illuminates how Korea is associated in the form of forward linkage 
and backward linkage in China’s gross exports to US. In a nutshell, Korea is engaged in production as well as 
final demand in the process of China’s exports to US. A trade between two countries is not merely bilaterally 
concerned, but there are complicated connections in harness with foreign countries before and after the exports. 
First of all, from production’s point of view, the case of Korea’s intermediate exports to China and re-exports to 
US as a final destination (Korea→China→US) comprise 1.37% of China’s gross exports to US. By assumption, 
when China’s exports to US down by 25.6% come to the realization, Korea’s intermediate exports to China 
accordingly fall by US$ 1.219billion (-25.6%) in ‘Korea→China→US’ trade. 
Secondly, in the light of China’s gross exports to US setting Korea as a final destination (China→US→Korea), 
when China’s exports to US decline by 25.6%, Korea’s final demand would be on a par with 25.6%, down by 
US$ 90.76million. Its impacts on Korea’s exports and GDP by industry are presented as follows. 
Table 13. Effects of Decline in China’s Exports to US on Korea’s Economy by Industry (2014, millions of dollar) 
When China’s exports to US fall by 25.6% 
‘Korea→China→US’ ‘China→US→Korea’ 
Korea’s forward linkage in China’s 
exports to US 
Korea’s backward linkage in China’s 
exports to US 
Value Value 
Sector Total -1,219.114 -90.759 
1 Crop and animal production -0.323 -0.393 
2 Forestry and logging -0.080 -0.072 
3 Fishing and aquaculture -0.014 -0.064 
4 Mining and quarrying -1.471 -0.448 
5 Food and beverages -3.020 -0.674 
6 Textiles and apparel -84.232 -1.803 
7 Wood -2.574 -0.779 
8 Paper -4.576 -1.747 
9 Printing and recorded media -0.259 -0.041 
10 Coke and refined petroleum -1.848 -0.932 
11 Chemicals -32.342 -13.939 
12 Pharmaceutical products -2.547 -1.252 
13 Rubber and Plastic -22.563 -3.322 
14 Non-metallic mineral -6.685 -1.989 
15 Basic metals -8.967 -4.152 
16 Fabricated metal products -21.540 -6.275 
17 Computer and electronic -777.344 -21.753 
18 Electrical equipment -90.100 -8.859 
19 Machinery and equipment -72.793 -11.591 
20 Motor vehicles and trailers -28.949 -5.207 
21 Other transport equipment -8.516 -0.852 
22 Furniture -32.593 -0.970 
23 
Repair and installation of machinery and 
equipment 
- - 
24 Electricity, gas, steam -0.501 -0.110 
25 Water collection, treatment and supply -0.032 -0.007 
26 Sewerage; waste collection -0.302 -0.039 
27 Construction - - 
28-56 Services -14.945 -3.487 
Source: calculated by the author based on WIOD 2014. 
Note 1) Service is least considered in this paper. 
In forward linkage perspective, the most damaged industry is viewed as computer and electronic (US$ 777.3 
million) followed by electrical equipment (US$ 90.1million), textile and apparel (US$ 84.2million), and  
machinery  (US$ 72.8million). What matters is that Korea generally has large proportion of intermediate goods 
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exports in terms of its bilateral trade with China. On the whole, its effect on Korea’s gross intermediate exports to 
China would be expected down by 1.05% and comprehensively, Korea’s gross exports to China would decrease 
by 0.72%. 
From backward linkage aspect, the most affected sectors by decrease in China’s exports to US are computer and 
electronic (US$ 21.8million), chemicals (US$ 14million), and machinery (US$ 11.6million) in order. Thus, 
Korea’s decrease in final demand from China is equal to US$ 90.8million. Given Korea’s GDP, Korea would 
suffer from -0.007% of GDP growth. 
5. When US’s Exports to China Fall 
Table 14. Decomposition of US’s Gross Exports to China by Factors of Value Added (2014, billions of dollars) 
US’s exports to China DVA RDA FVA PDC accounting error 
112.051 92.547 2.376 13.577 2.290 1.261 
100.00% 82.59% 2.12% 12.12% 2.04% 1.13% 
Source: calculated by the author based on WIOD 2014. 
Table 15. Decomposition of US’s Gross Exports to China by Final Destination (2014, billions of dollars) 
US’s exports to China China US Korea RoW PDC 
accounting 
error 
112.051 95.228 2.376 0.382 10.422 2.290 1.354 
100.00% 84.99% 2.12% 0.34% 9.30% 2.04% 1.21% 
Source: calculated by the author based on WIOD 2014. 
In 2014, US’s gross exports to China is US$ 112.1billion in total. US’s domestic value added accounts for 82.6%, 
US$ 92.5billion of value added, and domestic value added returned home takes up 2.12% of all, US$ 2.4billion 
in value. Foreign value added from other countries 12.12%, US$ 13.6billion in value. Looking at US’s gross 
exports to China on the basis of final demand country, 85% of the gross exports was satisfied in China for the 
consumption of final goods. 2.12% of US’s gross exports to China returns US and is used in home country. 
Meanwhile, 0.34% of all is finally consumed in Korea. 
Table 16. Decomposition of US’s Gross Exports to China by Final Destination and Value Added Factors (2014, 
































112.051 81.651 1.574 0.416 11.585 2.376 0.382 10.422 2.290 1.355 
100.00% 72.87% 1.40% 0.37% 10.34% 2.12% 0.34% 9.30% 2.04% 1.21% 
Source: calculated by the author based on WIOD 2014. 
Considering two aspects simultaneously, Korea is in harness with US’s gross exports to China in the ways of 
forward linkage and backward linkage. In terms of output, Korea’s intermediate exports to US, which re-exports 
them to China through additional refinement and polishing of goods and the goods are completed and used in 
China (Korea→US→China). Korea taking part in forward linkage of US’s gross exports to China occupies 0.37% 
of the whole, which is US$ 416million in dollar. As mentioned earlier, given the scenario where US’s exports to 
China decrease by 21.3%, Korea’s exports of intermediate goods to US would accordingly confront reduction by 
US$ 88.5million. 
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With respect to backward linkage, on the contrary, US exports intermediate goods to China, which re-exports 
reprocessed goods (either intermediate or final goods) to Korea and they are consequently spent in Korea. 
Regarding ‘US→China→Korea’ trade, 0.34% of US’s gross exports to China is consumed in Korea. If 21.3% 
decrease in US’s exports to China come to surface, Korea’s final demand would experience the decline by US$ 
81.3million. The detailed by-industry impacts on Korea are presented in the following table. 
Table 17. Effects of Decline in US’s Exports to China on Korea’s Economy by Industry (2014, millions of 
dollars) 
When US’s exports to China fall by 21.3% 
‘Korea→US→China’ ‘US→China→Korea’ 
Korea’s forward linkage 
in US’s exports to China 
Korea’s backward linkage 
in US’s exports to China 
Value Value 
Sector Total -88.534 -81.306 
1 Crop and animal production -3.478 -11.169 
2 Forestry and logging -0.053 -0.334 
3 Fishing and aquaculture -0.019 -0.0002 
4 Mining and quarrying -0.424 -3.149 
5 Food and beverages -2.486 -2.883 
6 Textiles and apparel -0.454 -0.583 
7 Wood -0.435 -0.805 
8 Paper -1.346 -2.285 
9 Printing and recorded media -0.113 -0.150 
10 Coke and refined petroleum -0.459 -1.559 
11 Chemicals -5.473 -12.766 
12 Pharmaceutical products -1.199 -0.250 
13 Rubber and Plastic -1.225 -1.045 
14 Non-metallic mineral -0.336 -0.359 
15 Basic metals -1.019 -1.398 
16 Fabricated metal products -1.127 -0.871 
17 Computer and electronic -7.619 -9.324 
18 Electrical equipment -1.785 -1.425 
19 Machinery and equipment -11.134 -4.670 
20 Motor vehicles and trailers -19.507 -0.601 
21 Other transport equipment -17.922 -0.812 
22 Furniture -2.500 -1.377 
23 Repair and installation of machinery and 
equipment 
-0.0001 -0.0001 
24 Electricity, gas, steam -0.003 -0.020 
25 Water collection, treatment and supply -0.00003 -0.0001 
26 Sewerage; waste collection -0.189 -0.451 
27 Construction -0.0003 -0.0004 
28-56 Services -8.229 -23.022 
Source: calculated by the author based on WIOD 2014. 
Note: 1) Service is least considered in this paper. Refer to Appendix A to see the details. 
In forward linkage perspective, the most affected sector from the decrease in US’s exports to China is motor vehicle 
(US$ 19.5million). Next comes transports equipment (US$ 17.9million), followed by machinery (US$ 11.1million). 
The table demonstrates that those industries are deeply associated with intermediate output to US. The total value of 
reduction is US$ 88.5million from US’s exports to China down by 21.3%. As a result, Korea’s gross intermediate 
goods to US would undergo down by 0.2%, and it would be down by 0.11% in terms of Korea’s gross exports to US. 
In backward linkage perspective, chemicals (US$ 12.8million), crop and animal production (US$ 11.2million), 
computer and electronics (US$ 9.3million) are regarded as the most damaged sectors in terms of final demand. As 
Korea’s final demand in ‘US→China→Korea’ trade would fall by US$81.3million, Korea would suffer from -
0.0063% of GDP growth. 
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V. Conclusion from the Findings 
The studies on China-US’s trade war and its impacts on Korean economy were implemented in the consideration 
of two hypotheses; China and US’s economic slowdown (GDP), and their bilateral exports decline. Making a 
comparison of the results from the two models, the ripple effects that Korea would suffer from are bigger in 
China’s case. Even though it is under the same condition where China and US’s GDP identically fall by 1%, 
China’s case would bring about stronger impacts on Korea. In a nutshell, the outcome illustrates that the extent of 
the damage that Korea would undergo is always larger in China’s bad-case scenarios compared to US’s bad-case 
scenarios which reveals that Korea is more associated with China than US in global value chains. The findings of 
the analysis are arranged and diagrammed in a table as follows. 
There are some limitations in this study. First of all, the paper used data released in 2016 which practically 
underlies input output data in 2014. The data used in this paper is hard to perfectly fit into a current situation 
of Chins-US trade war still happening in 2019. So, there is a concern over applying the analysis findings to 
practice in reality. Also, in the middle of ‘decomposition of gross exports’ analysis, there existed a certain amount 
of accounting errors. It is a shame that the study failed to completely decompose gross exports into 16 value added 
terms even though the error is small and does not have a significant influence on the results. Thus, the results have 
a margin of error to some degree. 
Table 18. The Findings of Analysis on China-US Trade War’s Impacts on Korea 
 Korea’s GDP 
(1) China’s GDP fall by 1% -0.066% 
US’s GDP fall by 0.3% -0.014% 
(2) 
China’s exports to US fall by 25.6% 
Korea’s gross intermediate 
exports to China 
Korea’s gross exports to 
China 
Korea’s GDP 
-1.05% -0.72% -0.007% 
US’s exports to China fall by 21.3% 
Korea’s gross intermediate 
exports to US 
Korea’s gross exports to US Korea’s GDP 
-0.2% -0.11% -0.0063% 
Source: rearranged by the author based on the findings in the text. 
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